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RFRA-VOTE GAMBLING: WHY PAULSEN 
IS WRONG, AS USUAL 
Suzanna Sherry* 
Supreme Court currents are no less treacherous to naviga-
tors than are river currents-and, as Michael Paulsen himself has 
previously pointed out, RFRA shares more than a linguistic 
resonance with a river.l Unfortunately, this time Paulsen has let 
himself be fooled by the prevailing political winds into believing 
that there will be smooth sailing for his favorite statute despite 
the swirling eddies ahead. He is altogether too confident of a 
favorable result. 
Although I have no wagers, public or private (and I am 
shocked-shocked!-to find gambling in this establishment) on 
the outcome of Boerne v. Flores, I want to use my editorial pre-
rogative to take issue with my colleague's predictions. Indeed, 
he seems to have things exactly backward. 
I start with the liberal wing of the Court, and the Justices 
Paulsen seems to be most doubtful of: Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer. Together with Justice Souter, they would support RFRA 
for at least two independent reasons. First, I am more confident 
than Paulsen that all three would vote to overturn Smith; they 
believe that RFRA incorporates a correct interpretation of the 
Free Exercise Clause. This is a good bet from the outset: 
Smith supporters are few and far between. Among religion law 
scholars, for example, opposition to Smith is one of the few issues 
on which the left and the right generally agree. RFRA itself 
passed Congress by an overwhelming (and strongly bi-partisan) 
margin. Accommodation of religion can be viewed as either pro-
tective of religion (in which case it appeals to many conserva-
tives) or protective of individual liberty (in which case it appeals 
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to many liberals). The combination is almost unbeatable: only a 
few iconoclasts like me find Smith persuasive.z 
Moreover, all three liberal Justices are likely to support a 
reasonably broad Morgan power, and thus to allow Congress 
some discretion even were Smith correctly decided. In particular, 
they would likely support RFRA as a prophylactic measure 
designed merely to prevent intentional religious discrimination, 
which is banned by the First Amendment. They thus need not 
reach the interesting question that Justice O'Connor might have 
to consider about whose view of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Congress is entitled to consult. (I'll get to that question later.) I 
would count them as three sure votes to affirm. 
Paulsen is too sure of the votes of the three conservative 
Justices, however. He argues that any attack on RFRA would 
require them to launch a jihad against Morgan. But these three 
Justices have already launched their jihad against congressional 
power, and destroying Morgan would fit right in. In United 
States v. Lopez,3 in New York v. United States,4 and in Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida,s they abandoned prior precedent in order to 
keep Congress within strict bounds. Add to this their support 
(or, in the case of Justice Thomas, presumptive support) for the 
result in Smith, and it seems highly unlikely that any of them will 
vote to uphold the congressional attempt to nullify it. Paulsen's 
ingenious suggestions on how to uphold RFRA while simultane-
ously distinguishing Smith, and still keeping the section five 
power within bounds, are just a little too clever for these straight-
forward federalists. Count three votes to reverse the lower court 
and invalidate RFRA. 
And what of the middle? Paulsen is right to waffle on Justice 
Stevens, and he is right about the reasons. Justice Stevens thinks 
Smith is rightly decided, and seems to think that accommodation 
is affirmatively unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. 
He may be especially concerned to the extent that RFRA pro-
tects religious organizations, as such, rather than individual be-
lievers. Nevertheless, he also seems, at least these days, to 
support a very broad power under Morgan. (He was not always 
so sanguine about congressional power: his concurrence in Fitz-
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patrick v. Bitzer suggested pretty strict limits on Congress's 
power to redefine rights using section five.6) 
So what's a Justice to do? The only error in Paulsen's analy-
sis is that in Justice Stevens' view, Congress hasn't just done 
something "manifestly stupid," it may have done something actu-
ally unconstitutional. But the "may have done" is the rub for me: 
I'm no more certain than Paulsen that Justice Stevens will actu-
ally find RFRA unconstitutional as an Establishment Clause vio-
lation. Chalk up a probable but not certain vote to reverse the 
lower court. 
The count now stands at 4:3 to reverse, and the outcome 
hinges on the very center of the Court. What makes this situa-
tion especially interesting is that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor 
are each in their own way pivotal votes. A recent game theoretic 
analysis of Supreme Court voting behavior over the past two 
terms has shown that Justice Kennedy is the most powerful Jus-
tice.? Justice O'Connor-somewhat surprisingly-did not fare as 
well under this analysis, but her tendency to write opinions that 
split the difference among her colleagues makes her worth 
watching on this one. Moreover, these two Justices don't seem to 
be as determined to cripple Congress as their more conservative 
brethren: they concurred separately in Lopez, adopting a much 
milder tone. On the other hand, Justice O'Connor wrote (and 
Kennedy joined) the majority opinion in New York v. United 
States. She might view RFRA as a similar attempt by Congress 
to force states to "govern according to Congress' instructions,"s 
because it requires states to modify state laws. We might gain 
some useful information when we see how they vote in Printz v. 
United States,9 challenging the Brady Bill. 
Thus on the question of congressional power, Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor are hard to predict. The best hope for sup-
porters of RFRA is that these two Justices will try to avoid 
confronting the section five question, and instead finesse it by 
going along with the argument that RFRA is a prophylactic mea-
sure. The problem with that argument, for Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor, is that there are no congressional findings to that ef-
fect. Their opinion in Lopez seems to suggest that at the very 
least, Congress must contemporaneously justify its use of ques-
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30 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 14:27 
tionable powers with empirical evidence.lo It is not implausible 
that Justice Kennedy might author an opinion striking down 
RFRA with an implicit invitation to repass it with more extensive 
congressional findings about the likelihood of religious discrimi-
nation. Nor is it implausible that he would uphold it as a prophy-
lactic matter despite the lack of congressional findings. He could 
go either way: let's call it at fifty-fifty. 
As I mentioned earlier, Justice O'Connor faces one final in-
teresting dilemma not faced by any other Justice. She alone si-
multaneously leans toward cabining congressional power but 
overruling Smith. Assuming that there are not five votes to over-
rule Smith, she must answer the following question: if Congress is 
limited to implementing the rights actually contained in the Four-
teenth Amendment, should those rights be defined by the Court 
as a whole or by each individual Justice? To put it another way, 
Justice O'Connor agrees that the congressional interpretation of 
free exercise rights is the constitutionally correct one, even 
though a majority of the Court disagrees. As far as Justice 
O'Connor is concerned, then, is Congress bound by the latter 
view or may it rely on the former? I think a conscientious Justice 
can answer either way. Cases from Cooper v. Aaronu to Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm12 suggest that the judiciary is a unified entity 
whose ultimate voice is that of five or more Justices of the 
Supreme Court. On that view, Justice O'Connor should judge 
Congress against the voice of the judiciary, not against her own 
view of the Constitution. On the other hand, of course, section 
five gives Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, not the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Thus if in Justice O'Connor's view Congress correctly 
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no problem. 
I think this is in fact the hardest and most interesting ques-
tion raised by Flores, largely because it revisits the Cooper issues. 
But Supreme Court Justices usually try to avoid hard and inter-
esting questions, and I suspect that Justice O'Connor will do ex-
actly that. She therefore has an added incentive, beyond the 
uncertainty about Morgan that she shares with Justice Kennedy, 
to go the prophylactic route. Count her as a probable 
affirmance. 
10. See Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Polit-
ical Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 757, 762 n.30 (1996). 
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So we have one probable and three sure votes to reverse, 
and the same number to affirm. It's all up to Justice Kennedy. 
He truly is, as the game theorists have labelled him, The Most 
Dangerous Justice. Either way, this is going to be a 5:4 nailbiter, 
not a 7:2 blow-out. And, more important, even if Justice Ken-
nedy votes to affirm, Paulsen is going to win another wager only 
by narrowly construing the terms of the bet.lJ Chip, you should 
have learned from my mistake. 
13. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 797 
(1993). Paulsen describes in Lemon is Dead his wager (with me) that the Court in Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) would not overrule Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971). Although he concedes that Lemon is dead, he refuses to pay up because the 
Court did not technically overrule it. 
